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Transnational Wiretaps and the Fourth
Amendment
by KRISTOPHER A. NELSON*
Introduction
A fundamental point of contention in a democratic society is finding
the balance between the need for security and the desire for liberty. In the
United States, the Fourth Amendment to our constitution is the cornerstone
of this balancing act:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
Since 1789, as the interests of society have shifted, the courts'
interpretation and application of this language has changed as well. Thus,
we have moved away from a firm conception of the Fourth Amendment as
protecting property interests2 to a view based on protecting people from
invasions of privacy. Nowhere has this shift been more obviously on
display than in the treatment of "wiretaps" and other forms of electronic
interception of individual's private communications.
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 1998,
University of Washington. I would like to thank James X. Dempsey of the Center for Democracy
& Technology for assistance with my early research, and my wife for supporting me throughout
the project.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886); Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585, 598 (1904).
3. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places"); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967) ("The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize has been discredited.").
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Traditionally, "wiretapping" referred to the interception of
communication carried over wires. It began in the 1800s with the
widespread adoption of the telegraph and then carried over in the late
1800s and 1900s to the telephone.4 Originally, "wiretapping" connoted a
physical device-the "tap"-which was placed somewhere along the wired
connection between the two parties and allowed a third party to intercept
the communication.5 Today, wiretaps may be more virtual than physical,
allowing for the interception of, for example, faxes, e-mails, Web traffic
and Voice-over-IP communications.6
One of the key benefits to wiretaps, especially in modem times, is the
anonymity and security provided to the eavesdropper: there is generally no
way for the participants in the tapped communication to know if they are
being listened to or who is doing the listening. Technically, it is also
relatively easy to put a tap in place in the majority of cases. Coupled with
the prevalence of people today communicating highly sensitive information
over electronic devices, the use of wiretaps is an extremely valuable tool
for law enforcement, especially when pursuing organized crime and
terrorist groups.
Yet, this same boon to law enforcement presents a strong threat to
personal privacy and individual liberty because it is equally possible for
governments to abuse this power at the expense of the privacy and
individual liberty of its citizens. The Fourth Amendment protects
Americans within the borders of the United States, but its applicability
outside American territory is less clear.7  I maintain that Fourth
Amendment protections should cover wiretap evidence seized abroad, not
just evidence gathered within the United States. These protections should
apply whenever a prosecutor seeks to admit such evidence in criminal
prosecutions in the United States. Such protections are fundamental
whenever the government acts to gather or use evidence-whether that




7. See, e.g., United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Neither our Fourth
Amendment nor the judicially created exclusionary rule applies to acts of foreign officials."
(citing United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978); Stonehill v. United States, 405
F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969))); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-
6 (1957) ("The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority
have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land."); see also United
States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976).
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evidence was obtained outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States or not.
However, the practical application of these protections for evidence
gathered abroad presents problems. For example, can the United States
exercise any control over the methods used to gather evidence by foreign
police agencies? Does the exclusionary rule, meant to inculcate a respect
for the Fourth Amendment in domestic officials, have any positive role to
play in impacting the behavior of non-U.S. agents? Should we judge
admissibility based on other countries' laws or should we insist our laws
should apply abroad as well? Does it matter if the United States initiated
the wiretap or if the foreign country provided the information without
direction from the United States? All of these are potentially difficult
questions in the context of evidence gathered abroad for use in American
criminal courts.
To focus on this problem of wiretap evidence gathered outside the
United States, and how this evidence can be admitted into evidence in
criminal proceedings, I will look at the United States Constitution and
federal case law. Because I am focused on the issue of admitting wiretap
evidence into criminal prosecutions, this Note will not examine issues of
so-called "warrantless wiretaps" or wiretaps conducted by American
intelligence officials abroad for the purposes of intelligence gathering and
not criminal prosecutions. However, to the extent that information
gathered in such a fashion is admissible in United States criminal courts
under current law, this paper will briefly look at the issue of potentially
warrantless wiretaps by foreign governments, undirected by the United
States.
I. Brief History of Wiretaps in the United States
Finding the proper balance among privacy, security, and law
enforcement interests in the realm of wiretapping has always been a
complex endeavor. With rapid changes in communications technology
quickly reshaping the way people interact, the nation must frequently re-
examine its laws to ensure equilibrium among these competing concerns.8
The foundation of this examination is the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. But it has not always been a stable foundation.
Instead, it has shifted over the years as technology and society have
changed. For wiretapping, this shift began with the invention of the
telegraph in 1844.9
8. Cheung, supra note 4, at 2.
9. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 156 (2004).
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The first Supreme Court decision involving wiretapping came in 1928,
when the Court held, based on the Fourth Amendment language of
"persons, houses, papers, and effects,"'10 that the Fourth Amendment did
not apply to wiretaps unless there was physical trespass by government
agents." Six years later, Congress responded with section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934, which provided that "no person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish [anything about the communication]."' 2 The law did not
make wiretapping illegal, but rather governed the disclosure of information
gathered from wiretaps. The result was that "law enforcement agencies
and the government continued to wiretap with increasing frequency."'
' 3
In the 1960s, public awareness of wiretapping grew, along with a
greater realization of how easy wiretapping was to accomplish, and how
readily it was capable of being abused.14 Berger v. New York, decided by
the Court in 1967, "addressed for the first time how Fourth Amendment
principles apply to a [New York State] court-issued search warrant
authorizing the surreptitious interception of communications .... ,"' A
five-to-four majority held that New York's law, despite being judicially
supervised, violated the Fourth Amendment, and gave seven "constitutional
pre-requisites to court-approved monitoring of conversations."' 6  In the
same year, the Court ruled again that electronic eavesdropping was subject
to Fourth Amendment restriction, holding in Katz v. United States that
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment .... Wiretaps, according to the Court, were included in
this despite the lack of clear physical intrusion, because the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
12. Federal Communications Act § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§ 705 (2006)); see also CLIFFORD FISH.MAN & ANNE MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING &
EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 1:3 (3d ed. 2007).
13. Sarah Boucher et al., Internet Wiretapping and Carnivore 4 (2001), available at
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/student-papers/spring l-papers/canivore.doc.
14. Id. at 5.
15. FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 12, § 1:4; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
16. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 12, § 1:4.
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 18 The
twin decisions of Berger and Katz "made it clear that henceforth the Fourth
Amendment, including the warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule,
apply to surreptitious surveillance of communications."'
' 9
Congress codified the holdings of Berger and Katz into federal statute
in 1968 as part of Title III.20 Title III reads in part:
To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of
wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the
communication has consented to the interception should be allowed
only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and
should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing
court.2 '
In its most basic form, Title III outlawed wiretapping 22 except when law
enforcement agents obtained a specific court order.23 In addition, it limited
wiretaps to specific serious crimes and only as a last resort when other
investigative techniques had been exhausted.24 It required that interception
of non-relevant communications be minimized.25 Finally, law enforcement
officers were required to notify the target within a specific time period in
18. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
19. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 12, § 1:4. According to the United States Supreme
Court, searches conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and therefore
generally violate the Fourth Amendment. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; see also FISHMAN &
MCKENNA, supra note 12, § 1:2(c). The exclusionary rule essentially says that evidence obtained
in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights cannot be used at trial to establish a
defendant's guilt. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see also FISHMAN &
MCKENNA, supra note 12, § 1:2(b).
20. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006)); see also Boucher et al., supra note 13, at
5.
21. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 801.
22. Note that in 1986, Congress extended Title III when it passed the "Electronic
Communications Privacy Act" (ECPA) to apply similar limitations to new electronic
communications, including video, text, audio, and other forms of data transmission. Law
enforcement agents were now required to obtain a warrant to, for example, intercept and read e-
mail. Other forms of internet-based communications were not explicitly included (although
ECPA clearly implied they should be) until the passage of the "Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act"
(USA PATRIOT Act) in 2001. See Wendy Hart & Diana Johnson, Carnivore: Taking a Bite out
of Internet Privacy, http://gsulaw.gsu.edu/lawand/papers/su03/hart-johnson/.
23. See Boucher et al., supra note 13, at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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order to allow for challenges to probable cause and the conduct of the
wiretap.26
A. Named and Unnamed Parties
"[A] wiretap application must name an individual if the Government
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged in the criminal
activity under investigation . ,2' The government may seek a wiretap
authorization in order to discover the identities of suspected co-
conspirators, and a conversation involving a party not named in the
authorization that reveals that party's involvement in the criminal activity
under investigation is admissible.28 Do these unintended third parties have
a privacy right that is infringed upon when their conversations are
recorded?
The initial warrant is enough to cover all parties whose conversations
are intercepted, provided the warrant meets the requirements of Title 111.29
The Supreme Court wrote in United States v. Donovan, "In the wiretap
context, [Fourth Amendment] requirements are satisfied by identification
of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular conversations to be
seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that all those likely to be
overheard engaging in incriminating conversations be named., 30 Meeting
these requirements thus provides sufficient justification for capturing other,
unnamed persons. The Supreme Court, looking at statutory language and
legislative history, wrote the following in Kahn:
18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a) require identification
of the person committing the offense only 'if known' [sic]. The clear
implication of this language is that when there is probable cause to
believe that a particular telephone is being used to commit an offense
but no particular person is identifiable, a wire interception order may,
nevertheless, properly issue under the statute. It necessarily follows
that Congress could not have intended that the authority to intercept
must be limited to those conversations between a party named in the
order and others, since at least in some cases, the order might not
name any specific party at all.3 '
26. Id.
27. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 428 (1977).
28. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 156-57 (1974).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006).
30. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 427 n.15 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967)).
31. Kahn, 415 U.S. at 157.
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The Court also noted that "the Senate rejected an amendment to Title III
that would have provided that only the conversations of those specifically
named in the wiretap order could be admitted into evidence. 32
Unintended parties can be "aggrieved person[s]" under Title III. 3
Thus, they can contest admissibility of their conversations into evidence.34
In addition, Title III allows "any person whose wire, oral, or electronic
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used" to have
standing to file a civil suit. 35  However, if a third party has their
communications intercepted, they only have standing to file a motion to
suppress the wiretap evidence if it is to be used against them: "No rights of
the victim of an illegal search are at stake," said the Supreme Court, "when
the evidence is offered against some other party. The victim can and very
probably will object for himself when and if it becomes important for him
to do so.",36 Noting the enforcement provisions of Title III, the Court went
on to say, "[W]e do not deprecate Fourth Amendment rights. The security
of persons and property remains a fundamental value which law
enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout the rules
escape unscathed. 37
B. Wiretap Evidence in Court
Admission of wiretap evidence in United States criminal proceedings
is governed by Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which
indicate that all "relevant" evidence-that is, evidence "having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable that it would be
without the evidence" 38-is admissible, "except as provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority." 39 In most court proceedings, although the Fourth Amendment
32. Id. at 157 n.18.
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (2006) ("'[A]ggrieved person' means a person who was a
party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the
interception was directed.").
34. See id. § 2518(10)(a) ("Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or
before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire
or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter.").
35. See id. § 2520.
36. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
37. Id. at 175.
38. FED. R. EVID. 401.
39. Id. at 402 (entitled "Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence
Inadmissible").
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always remains a backdrop, Title III and related statutes are the primary
analytic source for determining the admissibility of wiretap evidence. n
To enforce Fourth Amendment protections, the Supreme Court
established the "exclusionary rule," designed both to protect criminal
defendants from illegally seized evidence as well as to encourage the
respect of the Fourth Amendment by officers and agents of the United
States.41  The Court later extended the exclusionary rule to cover state
actors as well, even when the prosecutions occurred in state courts.42 The
courts have not, however, extended the exclusionary rule to the evidence
seized by foreign officials, primarily because the courts have believed that
"there is nothing our courts can do that will require foreign officers to abide
by our Constitution.
4 3
A core underpinning of Title III was Congress's assumption "that
capture of electronic communications would not be an unreasonable
intrusion if there were stringent ex parte judicial review before the fact,
minimization during a search, and equally stringent adversarial review after
the investigation had been completed. ''44  This limited framework
supporting restricted wiretaps slowly degraded over the years after the
passage of Title III as law enforcement pushed the boundaries of what was
permitted and courts and legislatures began to allow them greater latitude
45in granting warrants. Nevertheless, Title III gives individuals a
framework to contest, via the judicial process, potentially unconstitutional
interception of their private communications. Under Title III, individuals
have clear statutorily-provided standing to challenge the validity of an
intercept, based on factors such as a lack of probable cause, a lack of
appropriate safeguards to minimize the intrusion, and so on.4 6
40. See, e.g., United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2007); Barmicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514 (2001); United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257 (1990); United States v. Chavez, 416
U.S. 562 (1974); Unites States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
41. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
42. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
43. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968).
44. James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 85 (1997).
45. This is evident in six main areas, according to Dempsey: (1) the list of crimes for which
wiretapping is allowed has grown from twenty-six in 1968 to ninety-five in 1996; (2) judges
rarely deny wiretaps (from 1991 to 2001, judges have only rejected three state or federal wiretap
requests, according to the ACLU); (3) the duration of wiretaps has grown as have the number of
calls intercepted; (4) the courts now allow wiretapping even when all other techniques have not
been exhausted; (5) the "minimization" requirement has not been strictly enforced by the
judiciary; and (6) suppression motions are rarely granted (only 4.3 percent of requests were
granted between 1985 and 1994). Id. at 75-77.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
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Complicating matters is that, to a greater extent than ever before, the
United States is pursuing interceptions of communications in other
countries. 4' This is part and parcel of efforts to fight terrorism and
organized crime, amongst other international concerns.48 Intentionally or
not, these interceptions could involve American citizens or residents, either
inside or outside of the United States. Within the borders of the United
States, Title III allows judicial oversight and gives standing to impacted
individuals to challenge a wiretap, and the Fourth Amendment allows such
challenged evidence to be excluded if it does not comport with
constitutional standards. But, what happens when the intercept takes place
outside the United States?
II. Wiretap Laws Outside the United States
The United States is increasingly collaborating with countries around
the world to prosecute crime. Doing so involves significant legal issues
which may be easier to understand with a greater background in the laws of
other countries with which the United States may cooperate.
A. Canada
The fundamental approach used in Canada to evaluate searches and
seizures is remarkably similar to that used in the United States. Part VI of
the Criminal Code (entitled "Invasion of Privacy") is the Canadian
counterpart to Title III and deals with the interception of communications,
including wiretaps.49 Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the
"Charter") is the Canadian equivalent of the Fourth Amendment and
simply reads, "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
47. For example, one report notes,
What the agency calls a "special collection program" began soon after the Sept. II at-
tacks, as it looked for new tools to attack terrorism. The program accelerated in early
2002 after the Central Intelligence Agency started capturing top Qaeda [sic] operatives
overseas .... In addition to eavesdropping on those numbers and reading e-mail mes-
sages to and from the Qaeda [sic] figures, the N.S.A. began monitoring others linked to
them, creating an expanding chain.
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/l6/politics/l6program.html; see
also, e.g., Eric Schmitt, New U.S. Law Credited in Arrests Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2007, at
A 10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/1 l/washington/1 lterror.html; Patrick Radden
Keefe, Five Myths About the New Wiretapping Law, SLATE, June 25, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2194254; James Bamford, Big Brother is Listening, THE ATLANTIC,
Apr. 2006, at 65-70, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200604/nsa-surveillance.
48. See, e.g., The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A.
Res. 55/25, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/25/Annex (Nov. 10, 2000).
49. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 §§ 183-196 (1985).
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search or seizure., 50 Cases by the Supreme Court of Canada interpreting
Part VI in light of the Charter have resulted in a number of modifications to
Canadian law, with a number of amendments passed in 1993 in particular.51
As in the United States, 52 the foundational requirement of Section 8 is
"reasonableness," 53 and the Supreme Court of Canada has held that for a
search to be reasonable it must be (1) authorized by law, (2) the law itself
must be reasonable, and, finally, (3) the way in which the search is
performed must also be reasonable.54
Specifically looking at wiretaps in Regina v. Duarte, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that, due to the protections required by the Charter,
government monitoring and recording required judicial authorization, even
if one of the parties consented to the monitoring.55 And as with the Fourth
Amendment in the United States, the Supreme Court of Canada has held
that Section 8 "protects people and not places.' 56  More recent
developments have put into question Canada's emergency wiretap laws,
which allow for wiretaps in "exceptional circumstances" without court
authorization. In Regina v. Six Accused Persons, a judge in British
Columbia ruled that section 184.4 of Canada's Criminal Code "is
constitutionally invalid legislation" and contravenes "the fundamental
freedom to be free from unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by
[Section] 8 of the Charter.,
57
B. United Kingdom
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 200058 ("RIPA") is the
primary legislation that monitors and regulates the lawful interception of
50. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11,
§ 8 (U.K.) ("Charter of Rights and Freedoms").
51. SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, GUIDELINES FOR AGENTS AND PEACE OFFICERS
DESIGNATED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA - ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE I
(revised ed. 1999).
52. R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (Can.) (analogizing Section 8 protections to rulings
by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding search and seizure).
53. Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.) (holding that an assessment of the
constitutionality of a search and seizure, or of a statute authorizing a search or seizure, must focus
on its "reasonable" or "unreasonable" impact on the subject of the search or the seizure, and not
simply on its rationality in furthering some valid government objective).
54. R. v. S.A.B., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678 (Can.).
55. R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).
56. R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, ' 29 (Can.).
57. R. v. Six Accused Persons, [2008] BCSC 212, 275 (British Columbia, Can.).
58. REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT, 2000, c.23 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/plain/ukpga_20000023_en_1.
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communications in the United Kingdom.59 It permits the Secretary of State
to issue warrants authorizing the interception of postal services or a public
telecommunications system in case of any threat to national security or for
preventing or detecting criminal activities.60  The requirements are not
dissimilar to Title III, and make allowances for some amount of judicial
oversight and citizen redress for violations. 61 Thus, although warrants are
issued by an executive officer, a senior judge reviews the orders and
publishes an annual report.62 In addition, an Investigatory Powers Tribunal
considers citizen complaints and can order remedies.63 Of particular
importance is the fact that wiretap evidence, however it is gathered, is
currently not admissible in United Kingdom courts. 64 Wiretap material
gathered outside of the United Kingdom in accordance with foreign law
may be admitted as evidence, however.65
Unlike Canada or the United States, the United Kingdom traditionally
has had no constitution capable of serving as a basis for rejecting laws
passed by its parliament, and thus no equivalent to the protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.6 6 Despite this, however, English
common law has a long tradition of protecting the same fundamental right
embodied in the Fourth Amendment, and the United Kingdom's
membership in the Council of Europe and the European Union means that
United Kingdom law is now subject to the European Convention on Human
Rights, specifically Article 8 (the right to respect of one's private and
family life).67
59. SS8 NETWORKS, THE READY GUIDE TO INTERCEPT LEGISLATION 61-63 (2007),
available at http://www.ss8.com/ready-guide.php.
60. Id.
61. REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2000: EXPLANATORY NOTES CHAPTER
23 4 (2000), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/en/ukpgaen_20000023en1.
62. PRIVY COUNCIL REVIEW OF INTERCEPT AS EVIDENCE, REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
AND THE HOME SECRETARY 4 (2008).
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 9.
66. HILAIRE A. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (5th ed. 2004).
67. See, e.g., Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, [2003] Q.B. 151 (U.K.); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (describing the Fourth Amendment as based on principles of
English common law); see also PRIVY COUNCIL REVIEW OF INTERCEPT AS EVIDENCE, REPORT
TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE HOME SECRETARY, supra note 62, at 42-43; CLARE OVEY &
ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2006);
see also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Feb. 28, 1996, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by Protocol I1 to The European Convention on
Human Rights, 33 I.L.M. 943, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/nrTreaties/
Html/005.htm.
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C. Denmark
Like the United Kingdom, Denmark is a member of the Council of
Europe and a signatory of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, more commonly known as the
European Convention on Human Rights.68 Thus, it is subject to Article 8
of the Convention, the right to respect of one's private and family life, the
closest analog to the Fourth Amendment. 69 As of 1995, Section 191 of the
Danish Criminal Code and sections 780 to 791 of the Danish
Administration of Justice Act ("Justice Act") govern searches in
Denmark.7° Specifically, Justice Act § 781(1) governs wiretapping, and
requires, among other enumerated requirements, "weighty reasons" before
a judicial official may authorizing a wiretap.71 In addition, Justice Act
§ 783 outlines procedures for acquiring a wiretap, section 784 provides for
an attorney to be appointed for the party being monitored, and section 788
requires notification unless such notification is modified by the supervising
court.72 At least one judge has argued that the Danish "weighty reasons"
standard is a much lower standard than the Fourth Amendment requires.73
D. The Philippines
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines provides the
foundation for analyzing wiretaps in the Philippines. Article III (the "Bill
of Rights"), section 2, of the Philippine Constitution is textually identical to
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.74  In addition,
section 3 provides additional privacy protections and is as follows:
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be in-
violable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence
68. Council of Europe, Member States of the Council of Europe, Nov. 16, 2008, available at
http://conventions.coe.intlTreaty/CommunlChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG.
69. Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead - Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 928 (2004); see
also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Feb.
28, 1996, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by Protocol II to The European Convention on Human
Rights, 33 I.L.M. 943, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ en/Treaties/Html/O05.htm.
70. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1095.
73. Id. at 1101 n.7 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("Although we have no way of giving content
to what is a meaningless phrase in our own legal system, it is clear from the facts of this case that
the Danish standard falls far short of our own probable cause requirement.").
74. Compare CONST. (1987) Art. IlI, § 2, (Phil.), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inad-
missible for any purpose in any proceeding.
75
Republic Act 4200 provides the statutory scheme for wiretaps. 76 It
generally requires judicial authorization and limits the crimes for which
wiretap orders may be sought.77 In general, "Philippine courts have a long
history of construing their constitution in favor of individual liberties.,
78
As a result, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Peterson that a
wiretap obtained in the Philippines without judicial authorization violated
that country's laws, as it would have in the United States.79 In the Republic
Act 4200, a public safety exemption does exist, although its scope is
unclear.80 Expanding on this, the Human Security Act, an anti-terrorism
bill, was recently approved.8' It provides authorities with much greater
power to intercept communications in terrorism-related investigations.
8 2
As a result, it is possible that much lower standards might apply to an
intercept in some situations in the Philippines than would apply in the
United States, especially regarding terrorism, and perhaps especially if the
information was to be used outside the Philippines. In addition, "illegal
wiretapping continues to remain a problem," and there has been an increase
in cases involving wiretapping in the Philippines.83
E. Russia
The Constitution of the Russian Federation recognizes the right of
privacy and the security of communications. Article 23 states the
following:
Everyone shall have the right to privacy, to personal and family
secrets, and to protection of one's honor and good name . ..
Everyone shall have the right to privacy of correspondence,
telephone communications, mail, cables and other communications.
75. Compare CONST. (1987) Art. III, § 2, (Phil.), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
76. An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communication, and for other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 4200, (June 19, 1965) (Phil.);
see also Unites States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491 (9th Cir. 1987).
77. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491.
78. Id. (citing Marcelo v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, 114 SCRA 657 (June 29, 1982).
(Phil.))
79. Id. at 491 ("We decide the case on the assumption that the search did not comply with
Philippine law and was, as a result, not reasonable under the fourth amendment.").
80. Id.
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Any restriction of this right shall be allowed only under an order of a
court of law.
84
The 2003 Communications Law protects secrecy of communications,
and requires a court order for wiretaps except as otherwise authorized by
law. 85 The Federal Security Service has not always required more than
administrative approval for some wiretapping activities, especially if
terrorism or national security is at issue. 86  Thus, although protections
somewhat parallel to the Fourth Amendment and Title III exist,87 it is
unclear how closely agencies must adhere to them in practice.
F. China
There are limited rights to privacy in the Chinese Constitution.
Article 38 states that the personal dignity of citizens of the People's
Republic of China is inviolable.88 Articles 37 and 39 define the protection
of freedom of the person and the home. 89  Article 40 provides for the
freedom and privacy of correspondence. 9° Warrants are required before a
search, but this is often ignored, and the Public Security Bureau and
prosecutors can issue warrants on their own authority, often without
judicial oversight. 9 1 The U.S. State Department reported, "During the year,
authorities monitored telephone conversations, facsimile transmissions, e-
mail, text-messaging, and Internet communications .... The security
services routinely monitored and entered residences and offices. 92
Information gained from a Chinese wiretap is thus unlikely to meet the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment as applied within the United States.
84. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 23; see also Privacy
International, PHR2006 - Russian Federation, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.privacyintemational.
org/article.shtml?cmd% 5B347%5D=x-347-559497.
85. Privacy International, PHR2006- Russian Federation, supra note 84.
86. Id.
87. For example, Russia is also a signatory to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Feb. 28, 1996, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
88. XIAN FA ch. 2, art. 38 (1993) (P.R.C.) (Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens); see
also Privacy International, PHR2006 - People's Republic of China, Dec. 18, 2007,
http://www.privacy international.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-559508.
89. XIAN FA, supra note 88, at arts. 37, 39.
90. Id. at art. 40.





III. Admission of Foreign Wiretap Evidence in
United States Courts
United States federal courts have held that wiretap evidence obtained
abroad is admissible in this country, even if obtained in a manner contrary
to requirements in the United States. 93 First, federal statutory law has no
application outside United States territory unless a contrary intent is
specifically indicated in the statute itself.94 No such intent is part of Title
III. 95 Second, the protections of the United States Constitution are much
more limited abroad, although some Fourth Amendment protections do still
remain in certain exceptional circumstances. 96  As a result, courts have
allowed information from foreign wiretaps into evidence even when the
wiretapping would not have complied with Title III or the Fourth
Amendment if performed within the United States.97 This follows from the
general proposition that "all relevant evidence is admissible unless there is
an exclusionary rule.",
98
A. Title III is Inapplicable Outside the United States
There is a "general canon of construction which teaches that, unless a
contrary intent appears, federal statutes apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." 99 Federal courts have held specifically
that Title III, the federal statute governing wiretapping and eavesdropping,
has no application outside the United States and "significantly makes no
provision for obtaining authorizations for a wiretap in a foreign country.
'' °
In United States v. Peterson, the Ninth Circuit wrote, "Appellants also
argue that the wiretap evidence should be excluded as violative of Title III
.... We reject this argument. Title III has no extraterritorial force."
10' 1
93. See, e.g., United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975) (federal wiretapping
statute inapplicable to communications intercepted by Canadian officials in Canada, despite
traveling in part over the U.S. communications system).
94. Id. at 711; see also Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341-42 (2d Cir. 1978); Foley Bros. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
95. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279-80 (2d Cir. 1974).
96. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981)).
97. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968) (admitting evidence
obtained during raids in the Philippines while saying, "If the raids had been conducted by United
States agents, they would have been illegal under our Constitution.").
98. Id. at 742.
99. United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Stowe, 588 F.2d at
341-42; Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
100. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 279-80.
101. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
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As a result, none of the statutory protections or requirements of Title
III apply to wiretaps outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Since much of the case law regarding admissibility and conduct of wiretaps
revolves around the interpretation and application of Title III, this result
changes the analysis of foreign wiretap evidence. Instead of relying
primarily on statutory interpretation, such an analysis must instead focus on
the transnational implications of the United States Constitution and,
specifically, the Fourth Amendment.
B. The Fourth Amendment Provides Limited Protection Outside the
United States
"As a starting point," wrote the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Morrow, "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to
arrests and searches made by foreign authorities on their home territory and
in the enforcement of foreign law, even if the persons arrested and from
whom the evidence is seized are American citizens."' 10 2 The Second Circuit
notes that "information furnished to American officials need not be
excluded simply because the procedures followed in securing it did not
fully comply with our nation's constitutional requirements."10 3 Miranda
warnings may be "overlooked" and "the lack of a proper search warrant
may be disregarded."
104
However, the courts have been reluctant to remove all constitutional
restrictions on wiretap evidence obtained abroad. Two "very limited
exceptions" apply to the general proposition that "[n]either our Fourth
Amendment nor the judicially-created exclusionary rule applies to acts of
foreign officials."'1 5 The first exception arises if the circumstances of the
search are so extreme as to "shock the [judicial] conscience," in which case
the courts can exclude the evidence improvidently obtained.,0 6 The second
exception is often referred to as the "Joint Venture Doctrine": if American
officials "substantially participated" in the search or if foreign officials
were acting as "agents" of American officials, courts may also exclude
such evidence. 1
07
102. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Stephen A.
Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J.
INT'L L. 741, 745-46 (1980).
103. Cotroni, 527 F.2d at 711.
104. Id. at 711-12.
105. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981)).
106. Id.
107. United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 510-11 (11 th Cir. 1994).
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1. Shocking the Conscience
While the courts have reserved the right to exclude evidence if the
circumstances of a search and seizure are so extreme as to "shock the
[judicial] conscience,"' 1 8 the actual application of this doctrine is unclear.
It is not enough, for example, that a wiretap is obtained "in violation of the
foreign law itself' as the courts have "not excluded the evidence under this
rationale."'10 9 The First Circuit explains, "Circumstances that will shock the
conscience are limited to conduct that 'not only violates U.S. notions of
due process, but also violates fundamental international norms of
decency."' 10 Such fundamental norms may include those found, for
example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.11' One domestic
case in which the Supreme Court did find "conduct that shocks the
conscience" involved the forced pumping of a suspect's stomach to extract
two morphine pills, later introduced as evidence." 2 Generally, courts have
been reluctant to find particular conduct, short of conduct approaching
torture, to be so shocking as to require suppression.''
3
2. Joint Ventures
Courts conduct a three-part analysis to determine the admissibility of
evidence seized as part of a "joint venture": (1) is the participation of
agents of the United States so substantial as to constitute a joint venture?;
(2) if so, was foreign law complied with?; and, (3) if it was not, did U.S.
agents act on a "reasonable belief that the foreign search complied with the
foreign country's law?
''14
First, was there substantial participation by agents of the United
States? Under what is typically referred to as the "Joint Venture
108. Barona, 56 F.3d at 1091; see also United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n.l (2d
Cir. 1970) ("There is no claim of 'rubbing pepper in the eyes,' or other shocking conduct.");
Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th. Cir 1965) ("We do not mean to say that in
a case where federal officials had induced foreign police to engage in conduct that shocked the
conscience, a federal court, in the exercise of its supervisory powers over the administration of
federal justice, might not refuse to allow the prosecution to enjoy the fruits of such action.").
109. Barona, 56 F.3d at 1091 (citing United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491 (9th Cir.
1987)).
110. United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480, 1483-84 (quoting Saltzburg, supra note 102, at
775).
111. Saltzburg, supra note 102, at 775.
112. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1951) ("[P]roceedings by which this conviction
was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.").
113. See Steven H. Theisen, Evidence Seized in Foreign Searches: When Does the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule Apply?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161, 169 (1983).
114. United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.C. 2007) (citing United States v.
Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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Doctrine,"'51 5 courts look to see "if American law enforcement officials
substantially participated in the search or if the foreign officials conducting
the search were actually acting as agents for their American
counterparts."'"16 The doctrine is a "purposefully limited exception," and
there is generally a "high threshold for a defendant to invoke it.'
' 17
Thus, in United States v. Ferguson, the district court found there was
not a joint venture between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") and the Royal Bahamas Police Force ("RBPF") because (1) the
RBPF initiated the investigation that included wiretaps; (2) the RBPF
determined the scope and direction of the investigation; (3) DEA agents did
not direct day-to-day activities; (4) DEA agents did not provide
"substantial resources, such as the provision of translation and decoding
services"; and, (5) DEA agents did not get immediate access to intercepted
communications. 118 - Similarly, in United States v. Rosenthall, the court
found no joint venture despite the presence of U.S. agents during a search
of the defendant's residence and briefings of the agents in advance by
Columbian police.' 19 And again, in United States v. Maturo, the court
found no joint venture, despite U.S. officials informing Turkish police of
the defendant's activities and reviewing tapes of the Turkish wiretap.' 
20
On the other hand, in Peterson, the DEA informed the Philippines
Narcotics Command of a suspected shipment bound for the United States
via the Philippines. 121 The Philippine authorities then initiated various
wiretaps and intercepts. 2 2  The DEA listened to tapes, "translated and
decoded intercepted transmissions," and advised the Philippine authorities
on relevancy. 123  The DEA also referred to the operation as a "joint
investigation.' ' 124 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that there was a joint
venture. 125 In United States v. Barona, the DEA asked Danish police to
place wiretaps, immediately obtained the information that resulted, and
115. Id. at4.
116. United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 510-11 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
117. United States v. Angulo-Hurtado, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
118. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 5-6.
119. United States v. Rosenthall, 793 F.2d 1214, 1231 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
120. United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992).
121. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 488-89.
123. Id. at 489-90.




provided an interpreter. 26 This, said the Ninth Circuit, was also a joint
venture. 1
27
Second, was foreign law complied with? The local law where the
intercept occurred "governs whether the search was reasonable."' 128 Since
"the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,"
' 129
"compliance with the foreign law alone determines whether the search
violated the Fourth Amendment."' 130  The first step in answering this
question requires determining what the foreign law is. This determination
is a question of law "to be established by any relevant source, including
testimony."' 131 The burden of defining foreign law currently rests with the
defendant: "The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to
prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire tapping was unlawfully
employed.,
132
In Peterson, the Ninth Circuit examined two parts of Philippine law:
the Philippine Constitution, which mirrors our Fourth Amendment in
relevant part, 133  and the Republic Act 4200,134 which governs
wiretapping. 135  Both sides conceded that "judicial authorization was
neither sought nor received."'' 36 The court noted, however, that there was a
"public safety" exemption in the law. 137 The court then looked for rulings
by Philippine courts on the issue, but found little to go on, although noting
that Philippine courts generally ruled in favor of individual liberties.138 In
the end, the Ninth Circuit chose to decide the case "on the assumption that
the search did not comply with Philippine law and was, as a result, not
reasonable under the fourth amendment." 139 In Barona, also decided by the
Ninth Circuit, the court looked to section 191 of the Danish Criminal Code
126. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995).
127. Id.
128. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491.
129. United States v. Purcell, 236 F.2d 1274, 1278 (lth Cir. 2001) (citing Ohio v.
Robinetter, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)); see also Barona, 56 F.3d at 1093.
130. Peterson, 812 F.2d at491.
131. Id. at490 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1).
132. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); see also United States v. Angulo-
Hurtado, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
133. CONST. (1987) Art. III, § 2, (Phil.).
134. An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communication, and for other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 4200, (June 19, 1965) (Phil.);
see also Unites States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491 (9th Cir. 1987).
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and sections 780 to 791 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act. 140
They "carefully review[ed] the record" and, as a result, "[n]one of the
evidence from the wiretaps is therefore subject to exclusion under the
Fourth Amendment."'
' 41
Third, if foreign law was not complied with, was the reliance by U.S.
officials reasonable? This is the "good faith exception."1 42 The exception
allows courts not to exclude evidence, even if foreign law was not
complied with and even if the search was therefore unreasonable., 43 The
reliance by U.S. officials must be "objectively reasonable": "permitting
reasonable reliance on representations about foreign law is a rational
accommodation to the exigencies of foreign investigations."1 44 The Fifth
Circuit explains, "The reasoning usually tendered in support of this
limitation is the doubtful deterrent effect on foreign police practices that
will follow from a punitive exclusion of the evidence in question by an
American court."'
' 45
In Stowe v. Devoy, the appellant argued to the Second Circuit "that
exclusion would deter further [foreign] intrusions upon the privacy of
American citizens."' 146  But the court was not convinced: "[T]he
exclusionary rule, as a deterrent sanction, is not applicable where a private
party or a foreign government commits the offending act. Rather, the
exclusionary rule is intended to inculcate a respect for the police of our
own nation."' 147 In Peterson, despite "assum[ing] that the search did not
comply with Philippine law," the court decided that the "reliance in this
case was objectively reasonable ... federal officers sought, and received,
assurances from high ranking law enforcement authorities in the
Philippines that all necessary authorization was being obtained."'148  In
addition, the court said "search and seizure law in the Philippines is less
than completely clear."' 149 And finally, to hold American officials "to a
strict liability standard for failings of their foreign associates would be even
more incongruous than holding law enforcement officials to a strict liability
140. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995).
141. Id. at 1096.
142. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 (9th Cir. 1967).
146. Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978).
147. Id.
148. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492.
149. Id.
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standard as to the adequacy of domestic warrants."' 150 As a result, the court
"conclude[d] that the good faith exception.., applies to the foreign
search" and allowed the evidence to be admitted.'51
C. Transnational Communications
Telephone calls and other communications regularly cross
international boundaries, and it is not at all uncommon for one party in the
United States to communicate with someone outside the country. Faced
with this situation, courts have held that the fact that one party was in the
United States during the wiretap intercept "does not change the result ....
The law of the locality in which the tap exists (and where the interception
takes place) governs its validity, even though the intercepted phone
conversations traveled in part over the United States communication
system., 152 This follows, according to the United States v. Cotroni court,
from the holding that "the federal statute governing wiretapping and
eavesdropping [Title III] . .. has no application outside the United
States."' 5 3
The courts have generally been comfortable allowing domestic
wiretaps that unintentionally target other parties, provided Title III
requirements are met. 154 Unnamed and unintended targets of a wiretap can
contest the admissibility of the evidence under Title III, at least when it is
to be used against them.1 55 While based on Title III, the fundamental basis
of these challenges is the Fourth Amendment itself, and the protections it
provides against unreasonable search and seizure. 56  These same
protections are not readily available when the wiretap is placed outside of
the United States, but target-either intentionally or not-an individual
within the United States.
Conclusion
As a result, there are two potential paths for transnational wiretaps to
short-circuit the Fourth Amendment's protections, even when the target is
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Stowe, 588 F.2d at 341 n.12 (citing United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.
1975)).
153. Id. at 341 n.12 (citing United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1974)).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006).
155. See id. § 2518(10)(a) ("Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or
before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire
or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter.").
156. Boucher et al., supra note 13, at 5.
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in the United States and is eventually prosecuted within the United States:
(1) foreign wiretaps initiated by foreign governments without the direct
involvement of the United States may produce results that can be used
against U.S. defendants, regardless of what law was or was not followed, or
(2) the United States may initiate or involve itself in a wiretap placed
outside of the United States in cooperation with a foreign state. Both of
these situations have the potential to seriously undermine Fourth
Amendment protections. The first situation almost completely escapes
constitutional and Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless the conduct involved
rises to a level close to torture. The second situation allows for some
constitutional scrutiny, but ultimately depends on the foreign law involved
or, even if that was violated, whether U.S. officials reasonably relied on
assurances by their foreign counterparts that the wiretap was conducted
appropriately.
Actions by foreign agents without U.S. involvement are least
amenable to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Deterrence is the primary
rationale for the exclusionary rule. 157 It is unlikely that foreign agents will
be deterred from conduct that violates the U.S. Constitution if the United
States is not even involved in the process until after the evidence is
gathered.158 In addition, "it is difficult to imagine that decisions of U.S.
courts to admit evidence seized solely by foreign officers encourage abuse
of foreign law."' 59 There remains the real possibility that even greater
cooperation between countries and officials may make it more and more
likely that decisions by U.S. courts on evidence-gathering methods may
indirectly influence foreign actions, but I do not believe we have yet
reached the point where U.S. courts can legitimately judge foreign agents
acting under foreign law with no involvement of U.S. officials. In addition,
countries with which we are most connected, such as, for example, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and Europe generally, are most likely to provide
unsought evidentiary aid to our law enforcement agencies. Moreover,
these countries are also most likely to observe similar safeguards to our
own Fourth Amendment. In addition, actions by the judicial branch in this
regard implicates separation of powers issues, and may be best left to the
executive branch and the legislative branch to negotiate and pass treaties or
influence foreign legislation to comport with our Fourth Amendment
protections.
If American officials initiate or are substantially involved, however,
the equation changes. There should be no benefit to U.S. agents to seek an
157. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
158. See Saltzburg, supra note 102, at 765.
159, Id.
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end-run around constitutional protections, and the exclusionary rule-
intended to foster respect for such protections-is perfectly suited for that
end. As such, courts should do more than require a "good faith" effort by
U.S. officials that foreign laws will be followed. They should also inquire
as to whether or not the foreign law rises to a level substantially equivalent
to our Fourth Amendment. At the very least, they should insist there has
been a reasonable basis for the wiretap. If foreign laws are not sufficient,
U.S. officials should insist on at least this minimum standard before
initiating or actively participating in a wiretap. Such an inquiry should be
made whenever foreign wiretap evidence, gathered as part of a "joint
venture," is introduced into an American court, but it is especially critical
to do so if the target-intended or not-is within the United States.
Constitutional protections, after all, protect "people-and not simply
areas"' 160 And to do so effectively, courts must act to prevent an end-run
around the Fourth Amendment.
160. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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